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April 30, 2026

Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities
Prince Charles Building
120 Torbay Road, P.O. Box 21040
St. John's, NL A1A 5B2

Attention: Mike McNiven
Board Secretary

Re: Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro – Request to File Report on Frazil Ice at Bay d'Espoir Hydroelectric Generating Station – Hydro's Reply

The Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, in correspondence dated March 3, 2026, requested a report on the frazil ice event at the Bay d'Espoir Hydroelectric Generating Station in January 2026. Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro's report is enclosed herewith.

Should you have any questions, please contact the undersigned.

Yours truly,

NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR HYDRO

Shirley A. Walsh
Senior Legal Counsel, Regulatory
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Encl.

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Frazil Ice at Bay d'Espoir Hydroelectric Generating Station

April 30, 2026

A report to the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities

newfoundland labrador hydro

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1.0 Introduction

In January 2026, weather patterns caused frazil ice to form at Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro's ("Hydro") Bay d'Espoir ("BDE") Hydroelectric Generating Station, forcing the plant to shut down for the first time in its history during a period of high electricity demand across the province. This was an unprecedented issue and, despite the events that occurred, Hydro ensured continued electricity supply for all Island customers through a combination of timely operational experience and actions, system flexibility, energy imports, and coordination across the organization and third-party partners.

During a typical winter, the reservoir freezes over to reduce water turbulence and heat loss to the air above, creating conditions that are less favorable to the initial formation of frazil ice. In the month leading up to limited production at BDE, there was no stable ice cover on the reservoir or forebay, as illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Satellite Imagery of Ice Formation in the BDE Forebay – December 15, 2025[1,2]

[1] Copernicus Data Space Ecosystem. (n.d.). *Copernicus Browser*.
[2] Data is unavailable for the period of December 15, 2025 to January 20, 2026 due to cloud cover.

Over the course of the day on January 21, 2026, the weather patterns near BDE caused frazil ice to collect within the BDE forebay, as outlined in Figure 2. This ice accumulated on the intake trash racks[3] of all four penstocks, which convey water to the seven generating units.

Figure 2: Satellite Imagery of Ice Formation in the BDE Forebay – January 21, 2026[4]

This was unusual as generally, the reservoir freezes over to form an ice cover; however, the area of the forebay where water flows into the intake does not typically freeze over, as illustrated in Figure 3.

[3] A trash rack is a fixed screening structure installed at the water intake of a hydroelectric facility. Its purpose is to prevent debris from entering the penstock and turbines.
[4] Copernicus Data Space Ecosystem. (n.d.). *Copernicus Browser*.

Figure 3: Typical Ice Cover in the BDE Forebay and Reservoir[5]

As the formation of frazil ice began, BDE units were derated and removed from service to protect the assets.[6] This ultimately resulted in the decision to proactively shut down all seven BDE generating units on January 21, 2026; however, the shut down of the units did not stop the frazil ice from forming in the forebay. Frazil ice formation is a function of meteorological and hydrological conditions. Continued and consistent cold weather to create ice cover over a body of water is required to cease frazil ice formation.

The weather patterns in the Head of Bay d'Espoir area were conducive to the formation of frazil ice as temperatures ranged from -5°C to -1°C, with a wind chill of -15°C to -19°C. The area experienced wind gusts of 40 km/h on January 21, 2026, which contributed to a decrease in the water surface temperatures.

While such frazil ice formation has been normal for decades at other Hydro sites, such severe ice accumulation had not previously occurred in the 60-year operating history for this generating plant.

[5] Copernicus Data Space Ecosystem. (n.d.). *Copernicus Browser*. Image taken via satellite on February 20, 2026.
[6] Generating units are derated and/or removed from service to protect assets such as the intake structure, trash racks, penstocks, turbine runners, and associated mechanical and electrical equipment from ice blockage, vibration, and potential damage caused by ice accumulation and restricted flow. If the units are not derated and/or removed in an appropriate timeframe, the continued differential increase poses significant risk of trash rack collapse and subsequent catastrophic damage.

Frazil ice formation at the intakes resulted in reduced capacity at BDE, impacting available reserves. Hydro responded quickly, issuing a *Power Watch*[7] beginning the morning of January 22, 2026.

With BDE experiencing continued icing conditions at the intakes, available system supply approached maximum capacity. As a result, Hydro transitioned to a *Power Warning*[8] on January 24, 2026, asking customers across the Island to conserve electricity as available system supply approached maximum capacity. This was largely due to reduced production at BDE due to frazil ice, compounded by the issues experienced at the Holyrood Thermal Generating Station ("Holyrood TGS") in the preceding days. To continue to serve customers, standby generation and imports across the Maritime Link ("ML") and increased loading on the Labrador-Island Link ("LIL") were used to support the Island Interconnected System.

Units 1–6 were returned to service on January 25, 2026, and the *Power Warning* was lifted later that evening. The *Power Watch* remained in effect until January 26, 2026, at which time, available generation from BDE was sufficient to meet the system demand. At this time, ice cover had formed on the reservoir and forebay, as illustrated in Figure 4. Unit 7 was returned to service on January 31, 2026.

[7] Hydro's Advance Notification Protocol was created following the January 2014 supply events on the Island. The Advanced Notification Protocol is a public alert system to advise customers of the status of power supply so customers can be prepared in advance of any potential impacts. A *Power Watch* signals customers that there is no immediate action required. The electricity system is being watched closely and be prepared to conserve electricity if asked.

[8] As part of Hydro's Advanced Notification Protocol, a *Power Warning* signals customers to conserve electricity. This is a warning that current day electricity supply is getting close to maximum capacity, and customers should be prepared for rotating power outages.

Figure 4: Satellite Imagery of Ice Formation in the BDE Forebay and Reservoir – January 26, 2026[9,10]

Hydro prevented a province-wide *Power Emergency*[11] through a combination of timely operational actions, system flexibility, energy imports, and coordination across the organization and third-party partners.

Safety was prioritized and was identified as a key success, as increased and urgent operational activity across multiple areas was executed without any reportable incidents. Ice removal activities at BDE were executed efficiently, supported by experienced dive crews and established processes, which enabled the safe and effective restoration of affected intakes.

Hydro utilized its Electricity Feedback Panel[12] in February 2026, to seek customer feedback on Hydro's response to the BDE frazil ice weather events. Survey results indicated that Hydro's handling of the

[9] Copernicus Data Space Ecosystem. (n.d.). *Copernicus Browser*.
[10] Low image quality is due to slight cloud cover in the area on this day.
[11] A *Power Emergency* signals customers to conserve electricity, and rotating power outages are in effect.
[12] The Electricity Feedback Panel consists of electricity customers from across the province who provide feedback to Hydro through online surveys. The panel includes 988 participants from Newfoundland and Labrador, representing customers of both Hydro and Newfoundland Power Inc. ("Newfoundland Power").

energy conservation effort and its communications during the period were well-regarded, both receiving an average rating of 7.7 out of 10.

On March 3, 2026, Hydro received correspondence from the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities ("Board") requesting a report on frazil ice at the BDE plant. The following sections are presented in response to the Board's correspondence, with the inclusion of each question or request from the Board, followed by Hydro's response and applicable background information, where necessary.

2.0 Background

BDE, as shown in Figure 5, is a critical generating asset on the Island Interconnected System, providing an installed capacity of 613.4MW. The existing facility includes seven generating units across two powerhouses and relies on four penstocks to supply water from the intakes to the generating units.



Figure 5: BDE Generating Station Site Layout

BDE Powerhouse 1 consists of six 76.5 MW units (Units 1–6), supplied by Penstocks 1–3 via Intakes 1–3, with each penstock and intake controlling the flow of water to two units. BDE Powerhouse 2 consists of one 154.4 MW unit (Unit 7), supplied by Penstock 4 via Intake 4.

Prior to the events of January 2026, the risk of frazil ice at BDE had been characterized as low due to a number of factors. The BDE intakes are deeper and designed in such a way so that water flows more slowly than at Hydro's remote hydroelectric plants. In addition, reservoir and intake orientations at BDE were designed to provide shelter from prevailing winds. Ultimately, the environmental conditions experienced in January of 2026 aligned in a manner such that wind speed, wind direction, and change in temperature resulted in frazil ice formation such that the intakes became blocked.

A summary of the BDE units and associated intakes are provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Installed Units at BDE

Unit Location	Intake	Unit Name	Rating (MW)
BDE Powerhouse 1	1	BDE Unit 1	76.5
		BDE Unit 2	76.5
	2	BDE Unit 3	76.5
		BDE Unit 4	76.5
	3	BDE Unit 5	76.5
		BDE Unit 6	76.5
BDE Powerhouse 2	4	BDE Unit 7	154.4

3.0 Frazil Ice

The accumulation of frazil ice can occur when a combination of environmental and operational conditions align. Periods of sustained cold, supercooled[13] flowing water, and turbulent hydraulic conditions promote the formation of ice crystals within the water, known as frazil ice. These crystals can adhere to intake structures and trash racks, building up as flow continues. Limited opportunities for ice to consolidate into stable surface cover can further exacerbate the problem, allowing frazil ice to persist and accumulate. Ice cover helps reduce the accumulation of frazil ice by reducing water turbulence and insulating the water by reducing heat loss to the air above, creating conditions that are less favorable to

[13] Supercooled water - liquid water cooled below its normal freezing point without solidifying. It remains liquid because it lacks impurities such as dust, and air bubbles which normally initiate frazil ice formation. It instantly freezes into ice when disturbed or shaken.

the initial formation of frazil ice. When water flow at the intake is turbulent, a stable ice cover has not formed, and the water simultaneously becomes supercooled due to surface heat loss, the result can be rapid and significant ice buildup that challenges normal operations.

Frazil ice conditions are a known and recurring operational consideration at Hydro's hydroelectric generating stations, with established procedures in place at many of Hydro's facilities, including Hind's Lake, Upper Salmon, and Granite Canal. Additionally, the Exploits River generating assets operated by Hydro experience regular frazil ice events. In the nearly 60 years of operations, prior to the January 2026 event, frazil ice conditions were extremely rare at BDE. Hydro has procedures in place to manage frazil ice at its remote Hydro plants and applied those same philosophies when frazil ice was identified at the BDE plant. While the occurrence of frazil ice is beyond the utility's control, it is a hydrological event for which Hydro monitors and manages regularly across the system. Site specific operational controls focus on early detection and effective response. Proactive prevention of the formation of frazil ice at the intakes of Hydro plants typically involves the establishment of an ice cover on the reservoir, if the weather pattern remains consistently cold.[14] To facilitate the formation of a surface ice cover, generating units are shut down or their production is reduced, to reduce flow velocity. Similar to Hydro's approach for other contingencies, preparedness measures to manage site-specific operational risks have been implemented, where possible, to ensure supply is available elsewhere on the system in the event of decreased generation due to frazil ice.

Where operational requirements preclude full unit shutdowns, generation levels are reduced accordingly to reduce the accumulation of frazil ice. This action is balanced with other considerations such as system demand and other unit availability. Hydro has implemented enhanced monitoring systems at its remote hydroelectric generating stations to warn of conditions that have the potential for frazil ice formation.[15] This includes a series of alarms to warn of the potential of frazil ice and to advise when frazil ice is present on the intake trash racks. Inputs from monitoring equipment, along with consideration of other environmental conditions such as temperature, temperature change, wind speed, and wind direction would be assessed and allow operators to respond in accordance with operating procedures. While enhanced monitoring has not been required at the BDE plant due to its historically

[14] The conditions at BDE were not typical this year, as there was no ice cover in the reservoir during the frazil ice event. Usually the reservoir freezes over; however, the area of the forebay where water flows into the intake does not typically freeze over.
[15] Frazil ice monitoring systems are installed at Hind's Lake, Upper Salmon, and Granite Canal. If a system is unavailable or not functional, other available means are used to monitor for frazil ice conditions.

low frazil ice risk and as it is a staffed plant, Hydro is assessing whether enhanced monitoring is appropriate at BDE.

Newfoundland and Labrador has been experiencing more frequent and different weather patterns, which may increase due to the impacts of climate change. The events at BDE resulting from the formation of frazil ice may be an indication of such change. Hydro intends to engage a consultant in 2026 to assist with the completion of a Climate Change Risk Assessment, which will assess the potential risks of climate change across Hydro's assets system wide. This assessment is intended to result in a Climate Change Adaptation Plan.

4.0 Event Summary

In accordance with the Board's request, responses to the following questions are outlined below:

- How and when Hydro became aware of the risk of frazil ice formation at the BDE plant;
- A timeline and summary of events leading up to the decision to reduce generator output at BDE, as well as the subsequent actions resulting in the return to service;
- All technology and operating practices in place at BDE to monitor and react to the formation of frazil ice;
- The impact, if any, that low water levels in the BDE reservoir may have had on the formation of frazil ice in the intakes;
- The status of all hydroelectric and thermal generation, on-Island power purchases, imports, curtailable loads and capacity assistance available throughout the period when production from BDE was limited; and
- Details of costs incurred as a result of the frazil ice event including the amounts, if the costs are operating or capital, and whether the costs are expected to be recovered from customers. If there are costs to be recovered from customers, please explain how the costs will be recovered.

4.1 Sequence of Events

At 9:47am on January 21, 2026, BDE trash rack differential alarms annunciated, indicating a difference in water levels on either side of the intake trash racks greater than experienced under normal operation. Although trash rack differential values were elevated, the gradual increase in trash rack differential

levels did not align with patterns typically experienced with frazil ice accumulation; therefore, operational personnel intervened appropriately.

By 11:30am, Unit 5 and 6 were reduced to 20 MW as a result of operational personnel responding to increasing differential values at Intake 3. After this intervention, however, trash rack differential values at Intake 3 continued to increase, and Unit 5 and 6 were consequentially shut down at 12:25pm and 12:30pm, respectively. By approximately 1:30pm, increasing trash rack differential values on Intake 4 were also observed, and steps were taken to reduce Unit 7 to 50 MW. Reserves at this time were approximately 840 MW. Through the afternoon, trash rack differential values on Intake 1 and Intake 2 began to increase, and as appropriate, Units 1–4 were reduced to 20 MW. By 4:45pm, trash rack differential values on Intake 1 and Intake 2 were continuously increasing. To protect the assets, Units 2 and 4 were shut down, which resulted in a temporary decrease in trash rack differential values; however, trash rack differential values slowly began to increase again, and Unit 1 and 3 were shut down. Intake 4 trash rack differential values continued to rise slowly, and Unit 7 was placed in synchronous condenser mode.[16] By 6:00pm on January 21, all units at BDE were removed from service. At this time, reserves were approximately 250 MW. Operations continued monitoring the forebay conditions while the units were removed from service. As conditions worsened at the facility throughout the day on January 21, it became evident that the ice accumulation at the intakes was significant.

The Newfoundland and Labrador System Operator immediately began working with internal personnel, as well as Newfoundland Power, to activate its Advanced Notification Protocol and the process for customer notification of provincial power supply status. On the evening of January 21, Hydro notified customers via its website and social media channels, that a *Power Watch* would be in effect beginning on the morning of January 22. This protocol is designed to give customers timely, transparent information about our province's power supply status. Activating the protocol at this time ensured customers were informed and able to prepare, while Hydro worked to stabilize the system and avoid power interruption.

By 5:00am on January 22, attempts were made to restart Unit 1 as light frazil ice accumulation will sometimes rectify itself in the absence of moving water. This attempt was unsuccessful due to quickly

[16] Synchronous condenser mode is when a generator runs at synchronous speed without supplying real power, instead absorbing or supplying reactive power to help regulate voltage and power factor on the electrical grid. Operation in this mode does not require water through the turbine.

rising trash rack differential values and Unit 1 was shut down, reinforcing the severity of intake ice accumulation. Soon after, a remotely operated vehicle was deployed at the intakes to visually confirm the magnitude of frazil ice present on the trash racks.

At this time, with confirmation of frazil ice, emergency response actions for ice removal and dive operations commenced. Dive crews from across the province were mobilized to BDE. In addition, compressors[17] were installed at the intake structures to begin ice removal in advance of diver support operations.

The evening of January 22, generation at the Holyrood TGS was derated following a trip on Unit 2.[18] Reserves at this time were approximately 445 MW. In coordination with Newfoundland Power, *Power Watch* communications continued, and standby generation sources and non-firm imports over the ML from neighbouring jurisdictions were further utilized to manage peak demand to offset reduced hydro generation capability.[19] Efforts to secure imports continued for the duration of time that production was limited from BDE. As the province remained in a *Power Watch* on January 23, ice removal operations continued with dive crews manually removing ice build up at the intakes. To complete this work safely, it is necessary to close the intake gates to prevent water flow through the penstock. Intake gates 1–3 were successfully closed and divers commenced work to remove ice on the intakes that service the six units; however, the gate at Intake 4 could not be lowered due to damage sustained to the hoisting mechanism during lowering operations. As a result, divers were unable to enter to water to begin ice removal on Unit 7 until that mechanism was returned to service.

On January 24, divers continued ice removal efforts at Intakes 1–3. Hydro escalated the alert level to a *Power Warning* due to high forecasted Island load driven by the onset of cold weather, combined with limited generation capacity from BDE and Holyrood TGS. Reserves at this time were approximately 360 MW, while engineering and operational staff worked to repair the damaged hoist mechanism on Intake 4. On the afternoon of January 24, capacity at Holyrood TGS increased following the return of Unit 2 to service at 40 MW and the increase of Unit 1 capacity to 160 MW. In addition, standby generation

[17] Compressors help manage frazil ice primarily by powering air diffuser systems that introduce high-volume, pressurized, and often heated air into water intakes located directly underneath or in front of the intake trash racks to break up and dislodge ice.
[18] Holyrood Unit 1 was available at 125 MW due to forced derating, and Holyrood Unit 3 was unavailable due to a forced extended maintenance outage.
[19] Standby generation consists of combustion turbines and diesel generation.

remained available to support peak demand, and imports were able to be maintained to ensure system stability.

In the early morning hours of January 25, BDE Units 1–6 were gradually returned to service, loading each unit to 20 MW, to safely flush the ice from the tailrace and to maintain ice cover that had developed at reservoir, upstream of the intake.[20] As six units in BDE were brought back to full load, imports were subsequently stopped when no longer required. Following the return of Units 1–6, system reserves increased above public alert levels identified within the Advance Notification Protocol and, as a result, the *Power Warning* ended on the evening of January 25, while the province remained in a *Power Watch* until January 26. For the period of January 25–31, repair work continued on Intake gate 4 followed by ice removal efforts to return Unit 7 to service on January 31.

A detailed timeline is outlined in Appendix A.

4.2 Technology and Operating Practices

As a result of decades of operational experience, Hydro has established frazil ice procedures and monitoring systems at its other hydroelectric generating stations, including Hinds Lake, Upper Salmon, Granite Canal, and the Exploits assets which are operated by Hydro. While frazil ice is a common seasonal risk at these plants, frazil ice formation has historically been extremely rare at BDE, due primarily to the intake characteristics and orientation and weather patterns. Similar to other facilities with extremely low frazil ice risk, Hydro did not have site specific frazil ice procedures for the BDE plant but it would monitor trash rack differentials and complete visual inspections at the forebay and take action, if ever required.

Remote hydro plants that are prone to frazil ice formation have cameras installed at the intake structures that provide visibility of the water body supplying the intake As well as, a series of alarms are in place warn of the potential of frazil ice and to advise when frazil ice is present on the intake trash racks. Alarms related to the detection of frazil ice formation are available for Hinds Lake, Upper Salmon and Granite Canal, and include:

[20] This was necessary to avoid breaking up the tailrace ice cover too quickly, forcing ice downstream and potentially causing ice damming in the tailrace and/or damage to downstream infrastructure.

1. Intake Water Temperature: This is an early warning that conditions may exist which are conducive to frazil ice formation.

2. Intake Frazil Ice Potential: The frazil ice detection system monitors the rate of change of water temperature and indicates that conditions for frazil ice development exist. This alarm indicates that frazil ice may soon start adhering to the trash rack, resulting in an increased trash rack differential.

3. Trash Rack Differential: This indicator alarm may indicate that frazil ice build-up is occurring.

4. Penstock Level: This alarm indicates that the penstock is becoming de-watered with the wicket gate wide open, which could indicate a blockage at the intake.

BDE is equipped with trash rack differential alarms that are locally displayed in the BDE control room. Trash rack alarms exist to alert operators to the presence of any debris[21] that might be on the trash rack, restricting flow through the intake. While these alarms are visible and annunciated, the data is not stored for historical reference or trending. BDE is not equipped with the same level of monitoring infrastructure as Hydro's remote hydroelectric generating stations, as it has historically rare exposure to frazil ice.

4.3 System Availability

As the BDE system was unavailable to support the Island Interconnected System January 21, 2026 through to January 25, 2026, Hydro had to utilize other sources of supply to meet system requirements during this period. The information below highlights the status of Island generation, on-Island power purchases, imports, curtailable loads, capacity assistance, and water levels at the BDE reservoir at that time of this event.

During this event, Hydro worked closely with industrial customers, as well as neighbouring jurisdictions in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to help support the system. The Energy Marketing team secured necessary imports to ensure continued service. Use of imports, curtailable loads and on-island

[21] Trash racks can be blocked by a wide range of debris, including natural materials like vegetation, ice, or sediment, as well as human-made waste such as plastics, ropes, fishing nets, and construction debris, all of which can accumulate and restrict water flow.

purchases during this event ensured continued supply of electricity while Hydro addressed the frazil ice issues at BDE.

4.3.1 Hydro Generation

On January 21, 2026, during the frazil ice event at BDE, reservoir storage in Long Pond was 94% of the seasonal Maximum Operating Limit. This is slightly higher than Hydro's normal start of winter target of 90–92% Maximum Operating Limit due to a rain event that occurred on January 16, 2026. Therefore, low water levels were not a contributing factor to the event.

During the period from January 22, 2026 to January 25, 2026, when production from BDE was limited, Cat Arm and Paradise River were online and available at full capacity. Hydro's remaining hydroelectric generating stations, including Granite Canal, Upper Salmon, and Hinds Lake, were subject to derating during off-peak hours as a result of frazil ice mitigation measures, as outlined below:

- Granite Canal was fixed at 22MW from 6:00pm - 7:00am daily, returning to full capacity (40MW) each day;
- Upper Salmon was fixed at 50MW from 6:00pm - 7:00am daily, returning to full capacity (84MW) each day; and
- Hinds Lake was fixed at 55MW (full capacity of 75MW), 24 hours a day.

Hydro's extensive experience with frazil ice at these facilities allowed for controlled operation of these plants during periods of frazil ice risk. Mitigation measures were implemented during off-peak hours to ensure adequate supply was available for customers during peak hours.

4.3.2 Thermal Generation

Prior to this event, Holyrood Unit 3 was unavailable from March 30, 2025 until February 25, 2026 due to planned maintenance and overhaul work that was extended due to additional work found.[22] Holyrood Unit 1 was derated by 10 MW to 160 MW since December 17, 2025, limited by condenser back pressure. Holyrood Unit 2 was available at full capacity at 170 MW.

[22] "Quarterly Report on Asset Performance in Support of Resource Adequacy for the Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2025," Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, February 2, 2026.

At 7:37am on January 22, 2026, Holyrood Unit 1 was derated to 125MW due to a pressure drop on the fuel system caused by fuel heater fouling. The fouled heater was removed from service to allow Hydro crews to complete filter cleaning. At approximately 4:05pm on January 24, 2025, Holyrood Unit 1 was returned to service at 160MW.

At 8:13pm on January 22, 2026, Holyrood Unit 2 was unavailable due to a trip on the unit caused by high pressure on the boiler. Attempts to put the unit back online were made; however, the unit continued to trip due to hydraulic issues. On January 24, 2026, Holyrood Unit 2 was safely returned to service using "full arc steam admission" mode,[23] which bypassed the main control valve and utilized the turbine stop valve for turbine control. This mode limited the unit to 40MW until the cause of the hydraulic issues were known and rectified.

Following the frazil ice event at BDE, it was determined a loose pressure transducer caused fluctuations in the Unit 2 main steam control valve. This issue was rectified on January 31, 2026; however, the Unit remained derated to 70 MW due to an issue with the drum safety valve. This issue was resolved and the Unit was returned to service following an outage to address the drum safety valve issue on February 16 and derated to 150 MW pending the completion of safety valve testing. The Unit was returned to full capacity on February 24, 2026.

4.3.3 Standby Generation

During the time production was limited from BDE, all combustion turbines, including Stephenville Gas Turbine, Hardwoods Gas Turbine, and Holyrood Combustion Turbine were available at full capacity, with the exception of a two-hour derating of Hardwoods Gas Turbine to 25 MW on January 25, 2026 due to issues with the engine oil pressure instrumentation. Hawke's Bay Diesel Plant was available at full capacity, while St. Anthony Diesel Plant was derated to 7.7 MW since June 29, 2025, due to a failure on Unit 546. The Holyrood Black Start Diesels were available at full capacity with the exception of three hours on January 22, 2026, at which point they were derated to 6 MW due to an outage to diesel Unit 3

[23] This mode of steam admission is used for start-up of the turbine, and provides even temperature distribution at low steam flows. Normally during startup, the steam admission is switched to Partial Arc at about 20 MW as the unit is being run up to normal operating loads. Partial Arc is required for normal loading of the unit. By remaining on full arc, steam flow was controlled by the stop valve rather than the control valves, and it was possible to keep the turbine reliably at approximately 40 MW.

caused by a blown relay fuse, and an outage to diesel unit 5 caused by issues with the engine control module switch.

4.3.4 On-Island Power Purchases

On-Island purchases for the period of January 21, 2026 to January 26, 2026, included purchases from Kruger, St. Lawrence and Fermeuse Wind Generation, and Exploits generation. The charts below demonstrate the on-Island purchases during this event.

Kruger supplies power to the grid as part of Hydro's Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA"), in addition to capacity assistance in which Hydro can call upon additional energy if required.[24] Under the capacity assistance agreement with Kruger, Hydro can access up to 90 MW of power from November through May, and up to 50 MW during the remainder of the year.



Chart 1: Kruger Power Purchases – January 21–26, 2026[25]

[24] While Hydro maintains a capacity assistance agreement with Kruger, due to the mill outage at the Corner Brook Pulp and Paper ("CBPP") mill at this time, Hydro has continued to procure energy from Kruger under it existing PPA.
[25] CBPP was also experiencing frazil ice conditions during this period of time, which affected its ability to deliver full power to the system. This explains the reduced deliveries overnight and on January 25th, as shown in the graph.



Chart 2: Wind Generation Power Purchases – January 21–26, 2026[26, 27]

[26] Hydro purchases the full output of wind generation whenever it is available. As a non-dispatchable resource, wind generation cannot be controlled or scheduled in response to system demand.
[27] Wind generation data is unavailable for January 24–26, 2026, as no wind power was delivered to the grid during this period.

Chart 3: Exploits Power Purchases – January 21–26, 2026[28]

4.3.5 Imports

The Island Interconnected System is connected to the North American grid via the ML, which allows Hydro to make economic imports and strategic exports to support the Island Interconnected System. During the event in January 2026, non-firm imports across the ML were used to support the Island Interconnected System, in response to elevated system load driven by cold winter weather. However, as these imports were non-firm, there was significant uncertainty regarding availability and delivery timing during this period. Throughout the time production from BDE was limited, Hydro was delivering the Nova Scotia Block and Supplemental Blocks from Muskrat Falls, which were offset by imports when available.

[28] Rattle Brook provided energy to the Island Interconnected System during the time production at BDE was limited. Rattle Brook contribution to the grid during this time was 1.5 MW.



Chart 4: ML Imports – January 21–26, 2026

4.3.6 Labrador-Island Link

During the time when BDE was unavailable, the LIL remained in bipole mode and effectively supported system demands throughout this critical time. A protection card required replacement, and this minor issue was addressed overnight in a planned fashion, during off peak hours. During this event, the LIL carried as much power from Muskrat Falls as possible, a record of 785MW at one point (measured at Muskrat Falls), to help keep the system stable.

Chart 5: LIL Island Imports – January 21–26, 2026[29]

4.3.7 Curtailable Loads and Capacity Assistance

There were many contributors to capacity reduction during the time production was limited at BDE:

- Vale reduced load from approximately 40 MW to near 15 MW at the lowest point — a reduction of more than 20 MW.
- Vale provided approximately 7.6 MW of total relief from their diesel fleet through a combination of diesel generation delivered to the grid, and diesel generation used internally to

[29] Includes deliveries to Soldiers Pond; therefore, LIL losses are included.

offset Vale's own load.Braya reduced from approximately 17 MW to near 12 MW, a drop of roughly 5 MW, maintained through the most constrained period.

- Pine Cove Mill and FireFly responded immediately when asked, switching to onsite diesel generation and reducing additional non-critical load.[30]

- Newfoundland Power requested curtailment of its interruptible customers, resulting in a 12.1 MW load reduction.

4.4 Customer Communications

To keep customers informed about the potential risks and interruptions Hydro utilized its Advance Notification Protocol. The protocol is designed to give customers timely, transparent information about our province's power supply status. Activating the protocol ensured customers were informed and able to prepare, while Hydro worked to stabilize the system and avoid power interruption. Aligned with reserve levels outlined in the Advance Notification Protocol, and in cooperation with Newfoundland Power, customers were notified via Hydro's website and social media channels when a *Power Watch* went into effect, beginning on the morning of January 22, as well as a *Power Warning* beginning January 24.

In addition to power alert levels, other general information was shared with customers throughout the period, such as conservation tips for residential and business customers and outage preparedness information, and information related to electric vehicle use during periods of high system demand. Two joint news conferences were held on January 24 and 25, respectively, with participation by executives Robert Collett, Hydro's Vice President of Engineering and NLSO, and Byron Chubbs, Vice President of Engineering and Energy Supply with Newfoundland Power. Hydro hosted an additional news conference on January 26, where Robert Collett addressed the latest status of the BDE plant and system alert levels. In addition to coverage by traditional media, these events were streamed live on Hydro's Facebook page to broaden customer reach. Throughout the period, Hydro also participated in a one-on-one interview with a local meteorologist, to maximize customer information and education about frazil ice and the ongoing ice removal efforts at BDE.

[30] Curtailment during this event may have extended beyond these customers.

Following the system events in January, in February 2026 Hydro sought customer feedback about the events using its digital Electricity Feedback Panel. The online survey included a series of questions focused on the conservation period, including public interpretation of *Power Watch*es, *Power Warning*s, and other system-reliability messaging. The overall purpose of the survey was to evaluate how customers understood the information provided and to determine where additional clarity or adjustments may be required.

Based on data collected during the survey period (February 26, 2026 to March 5, 2026), results showed that Hydro's handling of the conservation effort and communications were well received by customers, with both averaging 7.7 out of 10. Awareness about the system events was also high, with 93% of respondents indicating they were aware of the conservation request.

4.5 Expenditures Incurred to Ensure System Reliability

To support the system during the event, Hydro incurred costs related to the purchase and generation of additional energy. This system event will help inform future utility investment decisions, capital expenditures, and operating costs associated with maintenance and emergency response. The electrical system involves many risks, most of which have a very low likelihood of occurring. Attempting to mitigate every conceivable risk, regardless of probability, would result in the system being prohibitively expensive.

4.5.1 Cost Type and Cost Recovery

During these events, Hydro did utilize its standby generation in accordance with its intended purpose - supporting the system during peak periods and contingencies. Further, Hydro incurred costs related to contractors and emergency response efforts to address the accumulation of frazil ice, similar to costs incurred during other weather-related events, including ice removal on transmission lines. Hydro considers costs incurred during this event prudent and appropriate to ensure safe, reliable service.

Table 2 provides a description of the cost incurred, the amount, and whether it is considered a capital cost or an operating cost.

Table 2: Summary of Cost and Cost Recovery ($ Millions)

Description	Approximate Cost	Cost Type
Power Purchases – Imports	5.6	Operating
Standby Generation – Fuel[31]	4.1	Operating
Emergency Response	0.4	Operating
Intake 4 Cable Replacement	0.1	Capital

Variances in fuel costs and power purchases from those levels currently assumed in Hydro's rates, such as the cost of imports and additional fuel utilized for standby generation, are deferred and recorded in Hydro's Supply Cost Variance Deferral Account. As a result of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador's rate mitigation plan, there will be no change in customer rates directly associated with these costs or any other costs that are incurred during system contingencies.

Other operating costs described above associated Emergency Response, are recorded as a reduction to Hydro's net income and are not deferred for future recovery. Therefore, there will be no impact to customers associated with these costs.

The required cable replacement at Intake 4 was capitalized under the Hydraulic Generation In-Service Failures Program. Cost recovery for these costs will be consistent with the rest of Hydro's capital program.

4.5.2 Imports

Energy imported to the Island during the period from January 21–26, 2026, includes energy purchase costs and transmission fees. The cost associated with energy imports during the period when production from BDE was limited is approximately $5.6 million.

4.5.3 Standby Generation

The role of standby generation in the winter period is to support the system during peak periods and contingency events.

[31] Fuel costs associated with the St. Anthony Diesel Generating Station, Hawke's Bay Diesel Generating Station, and the Holyrood Black Start Diesel Generators include the month of January, as diesel fuel usage is recorded at month-end.

The approximate fuel cost for diesel-fired standby generation for the duration of this event is provided in Table 3.

Table 3: Fuel Cost for Standby Generation - January 21–26, 2026[32]

Location	Approximate Cost ($000)
St. Anthony Diesel Generating Station	62.2
Hawke's Bay Diesel Generating Station	26.2
Holyrood Black Start Diesels	27.2
Hardwoods Gas Turbine	590.0
Holyrood Combustion Turbine	2,830.0
Stephenville Gas Turbine	590.0
Total	**4,125.6**

Standby generation is typically required during the winter period. For January 2026, the cost incurred was higher than the January average for 2021–2025 inclusive which is $1.1 million in an average year. At the same time, partially offsetting the increase in standby generation costs incurred is the reduction in the total thermal generation (including Holyrood TGS) due to the availability of the units as outlined in Section 4.3.2.

4.5.4 Emergency Response

Emergency response efforts at BDE included equipment rentals, purchase of tools and materials, internal labour costs, and diver contractor costs. The cost associated with the safe return to service of the generating units at BDE, including the labour and equipment to remove frazil ice from the intakes is approximately $0.4 million.

[32] Costs related to the St. Anthony Diesel Generating Station, Hawke's Bay Diesel Generating Station, and the Holyrood Black Start Diesel Generators include the month of January, as diesel fuel usage is recorded at month-end. The fuel consumed in January represents standby diesel generation due to two events that occurred on the system, including this event that resulted in an outage to all seven units at BDE due to frazil ice, and an event on January 12, 2026, that resulted in a temporary unplanned outage on the LIL. The total cost associated with this event would be minimal, as these diesel units made up a small portion of the overall standby cost, and the vast majority was from this event. During the previous event, these units operated for less than a day.

5.0 Conclusion

Hydro's extensive experience with frazil ice at other hydroelectric generating stations allowed for controlled operation of BDE during this period of frazil ice. Frazil ice conditions are a known operational consideration on Hydro's system, with established procedures in place at Hydro's other hydroelectric generating stations where such frazil ice has been common. Existing site-specific operational controls allow for monitoring and effective response at those plants.

Frazil ice formation is a function of meteorological and hydrological conditions that have been extremely rare at BDE. However, weather patterns are changing and the existing design of BDE is now demonstrating that the risk of frazil ice is not entirely avoidable.

In January 2026 when BDE experienced this rare and rapid frazil ice formation, Hydro ensured electricity supply for all island customers through a combination of timely operational experience and actions, system flexibility, energy imports, and coordination across the organization and third-party partners. To communicate transparently the risks and status with customers, Hydro utilized its Advance Notification Protocol designed for use during significant system events.

Following the conclusion of this system event Hydro connected with customers in its Electricity Feedback Panel to assess Hydro's response and communication. Survey results indicated that Hydro's handling of the event and its communications during the period were well-regarded by customers.

When the risk of frazil ice was clear, BDE units were safely derated and removed from service, as standby generation and other island generation options, as well as imports across the ML, were used to support the Island Interconnected System.

This event involved heightened activity across operational areas as expected and was consistent with the activity when other system contingencies occur, such as forest fires or freezing rain events. Hydro's urgent response was completed with no reportable safety incidents. Ice removal activities at BDE were executed efficiently, supported by experienced dive crews and established processes, which enabled the safe and effective return to service of all generating units at BDE with no interruption to customer supply.

In response to changing environmental and operational conditions, Hydro is assessing what options it should pursue to address this risk. This may include additional equipment to enhance physical

monitoring and site-specific frazil ice procedures for BDE. This assessment will determine what investments are prudent and appropriate. Hydro will provide an update to the Board as part of its 2026–2027 Winter Readiness reporting.

Appendix A

Detailed Timeline

April 30, 2026

Date/Time	Location	Description
1/21/2026 9:47	Bay d'Espoir Plant	Trash rack differential alarm annunciated at the Bay d'Espoir Plant. The trash rack values on intakes 3 and 4 were elevated, but not climbing fast.
1/21/2026 11:28	Bay d'Espoir Unit 5	Trash rack values at Bay d'Espoir Intake 3 continued to climb. Unit 5 was reduced to 20MW.
1/21/2026 11:33	Bay d'Espoir Unit 6	Trash rack values at Bay d'Espoir Intake 3 continued to climb. Unit 6 was reduced to 20MW.
1/21/2026 11:43	Star Lake	Star Lake Unit started.
1/21/2026 12:25	Bay d'Espoir Unit 5	Trash rack values on Bay d'Espoir Intake 3 continued to climb. Unit 5 was shutdown.
1/21/2026 12:30	Bay d'Espoir Unit 6	Trash rack values on Bay d'Espoir Intake 3 continued to climb. Unit 6 was shutdown.
1/21/2026 13:06	Hawkes Bay P235	Hawkes Bay Portable Substation P235 was isolated for testing
1/21/2026 13:37	Bay d'Espoir Unit 7	Trash rack differential values on BDE Unit 7 was still climbing slowly. Unit 7 was reduced to 50MW.
1/21/2026 13:57	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	Maximize HTGS Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to limited generation availability in BDE.
1/21/2026 14:09	Bay d'Espoir Unit 2	Trash rack differential values slowly increased on BDE Intake 1. Unit 2 was reduced to 20MW.
1/21/2026 14:20	Bay d'Espoir Unit 1	Trashrack differential slowly began to increase on BDE Intake 1. Unit 1 was redcued to 20MW.
1/21/2026 14:23	Holyrood CT	Holyrood CT started due to limited generation availability in BDE.
1/21/2026 14:32	Bay d'Espoir Unit 3	Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 trash rack differiential values increasing. Unit 3 was reduced to 20MW.
1/21/2026 14:33	Bay d'Espoir Unit 4	Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 trash rack differiential values increasing. Unit 4 was reduced to 20MW.
1/21/2026 14:33	Bay d'Espoir Plant	Trash rack differential values appeared to stabilize, but still higher than normal.
1/21/2026 14:57	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine started due to limited generation availability in BDE.
1/21/2026 15:45	Voisey's Bay Nickel Vale Standby Diesels	Voisey's Bay Nickel Standyby Diesels started due to limited generation availability in BDE.
1/21/2026 16:29	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant	Hawkes Bay Diesels Plant started due to limited generation availability in BDE.
1/21/2026 16:43	Bay d'Espoir Unit 2	Trash rack differential values increase on Intake 1 again. Unit 2 was shut down.
1/21/2026 16:46	Bay d'Espoir Unit 4	Trash rack differential values increase on Intake 2 again. Unit 4 was shut down.
1/21/2026 16:50	St. Anthony Diesel Plant	St. Anthony Diesel Plant started due to limited generation availability in BDE.
1/21/2026 17:00	Maritime Link	Emergency power from Nova Scotia
1/21/2026 17:12	Bay d'Espoir Unit 7	Intake 4 trashrack continued to rise slowly. Unit 7 placed in synchronous condensor mode.
1/21/2026 17:24	Bay d'Espoir Unit 3	Trash rack differential values increase on Intake 2 again. Unit 3 was shut down.
1/21/2026 17:55	Bay d'Espoir Unit 1	Trash rack differential values increase on Intake 1 again. Unit 1 was shut down.
1/21/2026 21:00	Maritime Link	Emergency power from Nova Scotia ended.
1/21/2026 21:00	Customer Communications	Hydro notified Island customers that a *Power Watch* will be in effect beginning at 6 a.m. on Thursday, January 22 posted to Hydro website and social media channels
1/21/2026 21:46	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Synchronous Condensor mode started
1/21/2026 22:05	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant stopped as units not required overnight
1/21/2026 23:02	Holyrood Diesels	Holyrood standby diesels stopped as units not required overnight
1/21/2026 23:14	Voisey's Bay Nickel Vale Standby Diesels	Voisey's Bay Nickel Vale Standby Diesels stopped as units not required overnight
1/22/2026 0:06	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Synchronous Condenser mode started
1/22/2026 5:12	Bay d'Espoir Unit 1	Unit 1 started
1/22/2026 5:28	Bay d'Espoir Unit 1	Trashrack differential increased quickly, Unit 1 shut down.
1/22/2026 5:48	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine online at 10MW
1/22/2026 5:57	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Gas Turbine started
1/22/2026 6:41	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant started
1/22/2026 6:59	Newfoundland Power	Hydro request to maximize generation - Newfoundland Power started CT's
1/22/2026 9:30	Customer Communications	*Power Watch* is lifted. Hydro shared this information to the website and social media channels.
1/22/2026 11:31	St. Anthony Diesel Plant	St. Anthony Diesel Plant stopped. Not required to support system at this time.
1/22/2026 11:43	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant stopped. Not required to support system at this time.
1/22/2026 12:48	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine stopped. Not required to support system at this time.
1/22/2026 12:52	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Gas Turbine stopped. Not required to support system at this time.
1/22/2026 14:44	Bay d'Espoir Unit 7	Unit 7 synchronous condenser mode stopped. Unit shut down.
1/22/2026 18:34	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods synchronous condensor mode started
1/22/2026 19:00	Bay d'Espoir Unit 4	Trashrack differential remained low. Unit 4 was synchronized to determine if trash rack differeintal values would remain low.
1/22/2026 19:30	Bay d'Espoir Unit 4	The trash rack increased as soon as Unit 4 was loaded to 10MW. Unit 4 was unable to run, and shut down.
1/22/2026 20:13	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	Trip on HTGS Unit 2
1/22/2026 20:22	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine loaded to 30 MW
1/22/2026 20:31	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Gas Turbine loaded to 20 MW
1/22/2026 22:18	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine stopped
1/22/2026 22:19	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Gas Turbine stopped
1/23/2026 2:19	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	HTGS Unit 2 Started
1/23/2026 2:31	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	Trip on HTGS Unit 2
1/23/2026 4:40	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	HTGS Unit 2 Started
1/23/2026 6:25	Newfoundland Power	Hydro requested Newfoundland Power to maximize all hydro generation
1/23/2026 10:08	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine Synchronous Condensor mode stopped
1/23/2026 10:23	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Gas Turbine stopped. Not required to support system at this time.
1/23/2026 10:33	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	HTGS Unit 2 started
1/23/2026 10:51	Newfoundland Power	Hydro's request to maximize generation was cancelled
1/23/2026 13:13	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	Trip on HTGS Unit 2
1/23/2026 15:25	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	HTGS Unit 2 started
1/23/2026 16:30	Hydro Place	Hydro meeting with Newfoundland Power
1/23/2026 16:33	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	Trip on HTGS Unit 2
1/23/2026 20:10	Customer Communications	Hydro issued a *Power Warning* for the morning of Saturday, January 24. information was posted to Hydro's website and social media channels.
1/23/2026 20:39	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine started

1/23/2026 21:00	Customer Communications	Hydro posted to the website advising island customers that a *Power Warning* will be in effect beginning at 6 am on Saturday, January 24
1/23/2026 22:12	Customer Communications	Hydro shared video with Rob Collett and Eddie Sheerr about the events at BDE, what frazil ice is and an explanation of the *Power Warning* to social media channels.
1/23/2026 22:13	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	HTGS Unit 2 Start
1/23/2026 22:45	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	Trip on HTGS Unit 2
1/24/2026 0:25	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Synchronous Condensor mode stopped
1/24/2026 8:00	Customer Communications	Hydri posted conservation tips to social media channels
1/24/2026 8:58	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine started
1/24/2026 9:46	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Gas Turbine started
1/24/2026 11:05	St. Anthony Diesel Plant	St. Anthony Diesel Plant started
1/24/2026 11:13	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant	Hawkes Bay Diesel Plant started
1/24/2026 11:29	Customer Communications	Media Advisory: Hydro notified the media of joint media availability with Newfoundland Power and Hydro at 1:00pm.
1/24/2026 12:00	Customer Communications	Hydro and Newfoundland Power Media Briefing at HP - Media Prep for Briefing at 1pm
1/24/2026 12:17	Customer Communications	Hydro posted Business and Commercial conservation tips posted to social media channels
1/24/2026 12:50	Customer Communications	Hydro posted EV conservation tips posted to social media channels
1/24/2026 13:00	Customer Communications	Media availability with Rob Collett and Byron Chubbs (Newfoundland Power).
1/24/2026 15:15	Customer Communications	Hydri shared video and pictures of the work being done at Bay d'Espoir shared to social media channels.
1/24/2026 15:20	Customer Communications	Hydro shared conservation tips, outage preparedness information and peak times information to social media channels
1/24/2026 15:27	Holyrood Thermal Generating Station	HTGS Unit 2 started
1/24/2026 17:30	Maritime Link	60MW of inadvertant payback to Newfoundland
1/24/2026 18:30	Maritime Link	Inadvertant payback to Newfoundland ended
1/24/2026 21:30	Customer Communications	Hydro posted to ocial media channels thanking customers for conservation efforts and reminder that *Power Warning* remains in place into Sunday.
1/25/2026 0:25	Bay d'Espoir Unit 6	BDE Unit 6 started
1/25/2026 2:20	Bay d'Espoir Unit 5	BDE Unit 5 started
1/25/2026 4:07	Bay d'Espoir Unit 1	BDE Unit 1 started
1/25/2026 5:53	Bay d'Espoir Unit 2	BDE Unit 2 started
1/25/2026 6:30	Customer Communications	Hydro posted to social media about Bay d'Espoir ice removal and unit restoration. *Power Warning* still in effect.
1/25/2026 7:33	Bay d'Espoir Unit 3	BDE Unit 3 started
1/25/2026 10:26	Customer Communications	Media Advisory Notice: Notice to media of joint media availability with Hydro and Newfoundland Power at 12PM.
1/25/2026 11:22	Customer Communications	Hydro shared photos of Bay d'Espoir to social media channels
1/25/2026 12:00	Customer Communications	Facebook Live stream of media availability with Rob Collett and Byron Chubbs.
1/25/2026 15:05	Customer Communications	Hydro posted conservation tips to social media channels, as province moves into peak. *Power Warning* remains in effect
1/25/2026 15:42	Bay d'Espoir	Bay d'Espoir Units 1-6 released for service at full capacity (6 x 76.5 MW)
1/25/2026 17:00	Maritime Link	50MW emergency power to Nova Scotia
1/25/2026 17:34	Maritime Link	50MW extra emergency power to Nova Scotia for total of 100MW
1/25/2026 20:22	Customer Communications	*Power Warning* is lifted, moved to a *Power Watch* .
1/25/2026 20:32	System Generation Reserves	North Atlantic Refinery Limited returning from 12MW to normal loading of 17MW
1/25/2026 21:10	Paradise River	Paradise River Unit stopped
1/25/2026 21:41	Maritime Link	Reduced emergency power to Nova Scotia from 100 MW to 50 MW.
1/25/2026 22:30	Maritime Link	Emergency power to Nova Scotia ended.
1/26/2026 9:43	Stephenville GT	Stephenville Gas Turbine stopped
1/26/2026 9:54	Hardwoods GT	Hardwoods Gas Turbine stopped
1/26/2026 10:49	Customer Communications	End of *Power Watch* : Hydro posted to social media channels confirming end of *Power Watch* and return to normal operations
1/26/2026 11:25	Holyrood CT	Holyrood CT stopped
1/26/2026 11:50	Customer Communications	Hydro posted to website that the *Power Watch* was lifted.
1/26/2026 15:00	Customer Communications	Media Update by NLH + NP: Facebook Live of media availability with Robert Collett and Byron Chubbs (NP)
1/26/2026 19:46	Deer Lake Power Output	DLP requesting to stay at 45MW overnight for frazil ice precautions.
1/31/2026 10:33	Bay d'Espoir Unit 7	Bay Despair Unit 7 released for service. Available at 154.4 MW